Ladies and gentlemen, your pilot is unconscious

David Learmount Uncategorized , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

An official incident report has confirmed that a Lufthansa Airbus A321 flight from Frankfurt, Germany to Seville, Spain on 17 February last year flew for 10min without any pilot supervision because the copilot, alone on the flight deck at the time, suffered a “sudden and severe incapacitation” which was defined in the report as a “seizure”.

An experience of my own many years ago was strikingly similar to this, so we will return to that subject in a moment after examining the events on Lufthansa’s Frankfurt – Seville flight last year.

Once Flight LH77X was established in the cruise over northern Spain at flight level 350 (35,000ft), carrying six crew and 199 passengers, the captain discussed pertinent weather conditions on the route with the copilot, who was the pilot flying, and then left the flight deck for a toilet break at 10:31:00 (UTC). Exactly 36 seconds after the captain had left the flight deck, the copilot suffered an epilepsy-like seizure, according to the Spanish accident investigation authority CIAIAC.

There was no immediate indication to the absent captain that anything was wrong, because the autopilot and autothrust remained engaged, despite some inadvertent switch selections by the copilot, and the fact that his right foot was pressing the rudder pedal hard – but fortunately not hard enough to cause the autopilot to trip out.

Meanwhile the sector controller for Spain’s Pau ATC region attempted three times to establish radio contact with LH77X, but received no reply.

At 10:39:00 the captain was ready to return to the flight deck, and he attempted a standard entry procedure, but there was no response from the copilot who would have had to approve it. After three further attempts he decided to employ the flight deck emergency access code, but while he was doing that the copilot, “pale, sweating and moving strangely”, opened the door from the inside.

The captain took control of the aircraft at 10:42:00, and at his request the cabin crew helped the copilot into the forward galley area, administered first aid, and obtained the help of a doctor from among the passengers. Meanwhile the captain decided to divert the aircraft to Madrid, the nearest airport, rather than continuing to Seville. The A321 landed safely and the copilot was taken to hospital, but released after examination.

The CIAIAC report quotes the definition of a “seizure” under these circumstances as “an abnormal paroxysmal excessive discharge of cerebral cortical neurons”. The copilot had no medical record of any such event previously, and said he had not experienced anything like it before. The medical judgement as reported by the CIAIAC is that, even had the copilot been tested specifically for such a condition, it would not have been detectable unless he had suffered a seizure in the presence of a medical observer.

The report’s main recommendation for the future is that, any time one of the pilots has to leave the flight deck, a member of the cabin crew should join the remaining pilot in the cockpit until the absent pilot returns. This is actually a previously established procedure which had fallen into disuse simply because incapacitation is so rare. But if it had been applied in this case, the cabin crew would have been able to alert the captain immediately about the copilot’s condition, and help him re-enter the flight deck quickly.

Meanwhile here is an account of my personal experience of airborne seizure – and precursors to it – that is highly relevant to cases like this one.

During my time as a qualified flying instructor (QFI) in the RAF I had gradually developed a condition which caused me to suffer minor seizures which, at the time, I did not recognise. They just felt like momentary mental “absences” that I attributed – for example – to having had a few drinks too many in the Officers Mess the night before. At the time I was in my late 20s, and had been flying pressurized jets and turboprops for eight years,

But my wife noticed these “absences”, and reported them to an RAF doctor who then approached me about them. I dismissed the matter as unimportant, and he did not pursue the issue further.

I recall having an “absence” while on short final approach to land a Jet Provost, solo, at RAF Linton on Ouse. I can’t actually remember the touchdown itself, but can remember rolling out at the end of the runway and turning onto a taxiway back to the pan, by which time I felt fine. But the thought of this event – now that I know more about my condition at that time – chills me.

Some months later I suffered a fully-fledged seizure during my sleep, and my wife called the doctor, who attended immediately. When I awoke I felt as if I had been beaten up.

I was taken to an RAF hospital and tested via electro encephalograph (ECG), and underwent brain scans. The diagnosis – given the evidence of the seizure – was that I was “probably” prone to epilepsy, but the condition was defined as “idiopathic”, meaning there was no medically detectable sign of it.

Continuing to fly professionally after that was not an option, so I left the RAF and became an aviation journalist.

At the time I believed my symptoms might have been caused by an sudden and unexpected application of quite high negative G during a practice aerobatic sequence flown by one of my student pilots. But the medics could find no sign of brain damage.

Over the decades since that time, in my job as an aviation journalist, I learned about “Aerotoxic Syndrome”, the name given to a condition caused by damage to the brain and nervous system by neurotoxic chemicals from aero engine lubricants and hydraulic fluids. High doses, gained via a “fume event” in the cockpit or cabin, can cause instant cognitive problems, although these may fade with time. But in other individuals, regular exposure to low doses of neurotoxins over a long time can gradually build up in the body, degrading the nervous systems of pilots and cabin crew.

These organophosphate chemicals, containing known neurotoxins, are delivered to the cockpit and cabin by aircraft air conditioning and pressurization systems, where the air is sourced directly from jet or turboprop engine compressors. Engine oil seals constantly leak fluid at low levels, so when the highly compressed – and therefore hot – air is delivered to the air conditioning system, it contains pyrolized neurotoxic aerosols. This is the air that the crew breathe.

In some individuals, that constant low-level poisoning builds up in their system until it causes visible symptoms of neurological damage. In other individuals, their systems gradually purge the chemicals, making symptoms last only a short time. But so far there is no way of knowing in advance which kind of system individual aircrew have.

In my case, today I no longer have even slight seizures, neither do I have to take any medication which, for more than 25 years, I had to do constantly to keep the symptoms at bay. Neurologists say, nonetheless, that they cannot declare me free of epilepsy or related neurological conditions because they still do not know enough about the subject to be certain. I suspect what has happened is that, since I left the RAF, I fly only occasionally, so my system has had time to purge itself of the neurotoxins that regular flying delivered to me.

I wish the Lufthansa copilot of flight LH77X on 17 February 2024 well, and hope he gets all the support he needs to continue his career, if that is deemed possible.

Meanwhile for him, and all those who want to know more about Aerotoxic Syndrome, FlightGlobal has a useful account here.

Trump rides to the rescue of US ATC

David Learmount Uncategorized , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

“The ancient infrastructure is buckling,” says the President of the USA, Donald J Trump.

His subject is the state of America’s air traffic control (ATC) services, but he does have a solution: “We’d like to give out one big, beautiful contract, where they are responsible for everything from digging ditches to the most-complicated stuff”.

Trump has casually tossed a simple solution to a serious national infrastructure problem into someone else’s in-tray. But is this even in his gift?

The political in-tray belongs to Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy, who agrees with Trump about the state of the air traffic management (ATM) system. Needing somebody to blame after the 29 January fatal mid-air collision between an army helicopter and a PSA Airlines Bombardier CRJ700 that was on final approach to land at Washington DC’s Reagan airport, Duffy attributed the crash to “our outdated, World War II-era air traffic control system”. Having delivered that verdict, he named his predecessor, President Joe Biden’s Transportation Secretary, Pete Buttigieg as the man responsible for the state of US ATM.

Meanwhile, taking Trump at his word when he said “We’d like to give out one big, beautiful contract…”, the chief executive of a major US electronics company is – surely – soon going to feel the thud of a massive Concept of Operations document landing in his in-tray. So will Chris Rocheleau, the Trump-appointed Acting Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration. Rocheleau, an experienced FAA man, was given the job in January, but so far no actual Administrator has been appointed.

In the USA, the FAA is responsible for providing ATM. The Administration’s two main tasks are the safety oversight and regulation of the entirety of the USA’s aerospace and air transport industry, plus the provision of ATM and its operating infrastructure. Unusually, therefore, the FAA oversees the safety of its own ATM system.

Finance for the FAA comes from the Airport and Airways Trust Fund (AATF), financed in turn by the users of the system who are charged taxes on domestic passenger tickets, freight carriage charges, fuel, and international departures and arrivals. These proceeds, which fund nearly 90% of the FAA’s costs, don’t go direct to the FAA: congress annually appropriates funds from the AATF for the FAA – but in practice it quite often delays the appropriation, bringing aviation to a halt for a few days. The reality is that the FAA is a state-owned utility.

Returning again to Trump’s stated plan for “one big, beautiful contract” to upgrade America’s ATM and air navigation services, unless the President has the FAA in mind as contractor (unlikely), he must be referring to private industry.

So who are the industry candidates to take the lead in this “big, beautiful contract”? If Trump’s plan goes ahead, one company will lead, and the others will contribute. The line-up looks something like this: Raytheon, Thales, Adacel Technologies, L3 Harris, Honeywell, IBM, SpaceX (Starlink), and Verizon (telecomms). Trump’s “America First” policy might rule out Thales for being French, although it is huge, global, and has a big US division.

What will Duffy require of this agglomeration of US industrial expertise? Here are some extracts from public statements of intent he has made in the last few months about ATM modernisation: “Rebuilding some ATC towers, control centres and Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) facilities; new telecom, new fibre… We are going to have brand new radios in our towers, new radar for the ground, and new sensors on our tarmacs; all the front-facing equipment for controllers, all the back-end systems for controllers – all brand new; all new hardware… All new software… A new flight management system that will support flights of future air taxies – the electric vertical take-off and vertical landing aircraft now under development by numerous firms.”

What is more, all of this will be accomplished within four years, says Duffy. A bill to approve funding to the tune of $12.5 billion is working its way through the House of Representatives.

The sheer size of the task of raising this system from its current state of repair can be gauged from a recent event. On 28 April, controllers at the Philadelphia TRACON “temporarily lost radar and communications with the aircraft under their control, unable to see, hear or talk to them”. That summary of the event was provided by the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA). Controllers at that facility are responsible for “separating and sequencing” jets flying to and from Newark airport, New Jersey, one of the three main airports serving New York city.

In the last few days the Philadelphia TRACON problems have recurred, according to Duffy, who resorts again to blaming Buttigieg. Meanwhile Newark airport is talking to airlines about reducing the flow-rate of traffic there for safety reasons. And the whole problem is exacerbated by a shortage of air traffic control officers (ATCO), which Duffy has acknowledged is nation-wide, and which the National Transportation Safety Board is examining as a possible contributory factor in the Washington DC collision.

Good luck to the FAA and its partner companies in this massive endeavour. They’ll need it!

Washington DC airspace will stay risky

David Learmount Uncategorized , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Activity in Washington DC’s urban airspace is now being constrained – just a little – by the Federal Aviation Administration following its discovery that the risk of collisions at or near airports across the whole USA is higher than the Agency had appreciated.

This fact emerged during the inquiry by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and FAA into the 29 January fatal mid-air collision between an army helicopter and regional jet airliner over the Potomac River near Washington Reagan airport.

This decision to reduce traffic, however, is likely to be challenged, and probably quite soon.

The appetite for instantly accessible air transport among DC denizens is insatiable because – they would tell you – of the febrile environment in which many of them conduct their political, lobbying, military or security business in the District. There is always high demand for flights to and from DC’s compact downtown airport close to the heart of the city, and it operates near capacity all the time. Reagan airport is right next to the west bank of the Potomac River, and the other side of the river directly opposite the airfield there is a confluence of urban helicopter routes (see chart below, helicopter routes marked in blue). In addition to that complexity, less than a mile to Reagan’s north west is the Pentagon, with its own heliport.

On the night of the collision the PSA Airlines Bombardier CRJ was approaching Reagan from the south, tracking northward above the Potomac River, intent upon intercepting the instrument landing system (ILS) for runway 01 to land. Meanwhile the army Black Hawk was to the north of Reagan, tracking south along helicopter Route 1 to join Route 4.

Reagan tower asked the CRJ crew if they could accept a late runway change to land on 33, and because the crew could see the lights of both runways they accepted the change, broke off from the runway 01 ILS while still at about 1,700ft, and made a slight right turn to head north to intercept runway 33 ILS. Approaching ILS intercept, the CRJ turned onto final approach at about 500ft. As the CRJ descended through 300ft toward the runway the two aircraft collided.

The circumstances of the collision are not surprising given that these operations were carried out under night visual flight rules (VFR), and the visibility at the time was such that visual identification and separation was practical, if not actually wise. Asked by Reagan tower if they had the CRJ in sight, the Black Hawk crew said they did, although the fact of the collision makes it clear that they had misidentified the regional jet. The lights of the city and airport crowd around on all sides, making misidentification easy.

It has since transpired that the army helicopter was not operating its ADS-B-Out to enable identification by ATC, which it was supposed to do. Right now there is a behind-closed-doors argument going on between the army and the FAA about the military use of ADS-B-Out. The army doesn’t like its aircraft to be trackable, and the FAA insists they must be identifiable in environments like DC airspace. There was, however, no special security classification that demanded stealth for this particular helicopter flight, which was carrying out crew training.

Chair of the NTSB Jennifer Homendy remarked upon the failure of the FAA to respond to the fact that the exact point at which the two aircraft collided had long been identified as a “high risk location”. This failure, she said, was “more than an oversight.” When it was published in early March, the NTSB’s preliminary report on the accident revealed that, between October 2021 and December 2024, there had been more than 15,000 “close proximity events” between helicopters and commercial aircraft near Reagan.

It may be a useful exercise to gather statistics like that to back an argument, but anyone who operates the skies near Reagan knows how busy it has always been, and knows that such a level of traffic density involves considerable risk, especially at night or in poor visibility. The operational requirements for a helicopter heading south on Route 4 are that, when passing Reagan, it is supposed to be at 200ft or lower, so that any aircraft on approach to runway 33 should pass over the helicopter at a height between 300ft and 400ft. The margins for error are tiny, both for vertical separation between the two aircraft, and for obstacle clearance between the low-flying helicopter and ground obstructions, especially risky at night.

The FAA has now decided to close Route 4 whenever runway 33 is in operation. But what if, like the day of the accident, the tower decides at short notice to change a landing from runway 01 to 33? Can sufficient notice be given to helicopter crews using Route 4? The agency plans to allow some limited helicopter traffic on Route 4, but only for “urgent missions, such as lifesaving medical, priority law enforcement or presidential transport”. Unfortunately such flights over this city are common, and there is a question as to who should authorize them. Meanwhile ATC will be expected to prohibit fixed-wing aircraft from simultaneously using Reagan airport’s secondary runways – 15/33 and 04/22. That combination of responsibilities is quite an ask for controllers as busy as those at Reagan.

The FAA’s administrator Chris Rocheleau, at a Congressional Hearing on 27 March, obviously bidding for the Understatement of the Year Oscar, said: “Clearly, something was missed.” The NTSB’s Homendy pointed out that the DC airspace incident data is there to be easily gathered, in the form of voluntary safety reports of near-accidents of all kinds, but admits there is a lot of it. Rocheleau says the Agency is now looking into using artificial intelligence to sort through “tens of millions” of such reports to identify – and flag up – specific risks and trends.

Urban aviation activity like that in Washington DC’s airspace would not be permitted in similar European airspace. Instrument flight rules (IFR) would apply, even if visual separation was used as a backup in VMC. That is not to say Europe is right and America is wrong. Each State has a right to decide what level of risk it finds acceptable, and to determine ways of ensuring that its agreed standards are met, in the knowledge that the authorities will take the rap if they get it wrong.

That is the question Washington DC must answer: how much risk do its denizens want to take, and should they be allowed to take risks at that level? In the 29 January collision all the people on both aircraft died, but the machinery fell harmlessly into the river. In a future collision, that might not be so.

In DC, my money is on a win for the risk-takers who are not prepared to slow down.

Awful Airlines, says Which?

David Learmount Uncategorized , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Ryanair has been identified in the UK Consumers Association publication “Which?” as the air carrier against which airline awfulness is benchmarked, and it has found that – by one particular measure, British Airways is even worse.

Airlines examined in this survey are among those offering services to or from British airports, and Which? says it is based upon a survey of 6,500 passengers who travelled in the last year. The consumer champion reports “a gulf in standards between the best and the worst”, and it places Jet2 comfortably at the top of short-haul ratings, with Ryanair at the bottom (and Wizz almost as bad).

In long-haul, Singapore Airlines tops the league, with British Airways firmly at the bottom of the nineteen carriers listed, and Air Canada close to it. Indeed, the mighty American Airlines scores much the same as BA, but can claim a Customer Score of 65% against BA’s 62%.

Which? scores all the airlines on 12 categories across the service spectrum. In each category airlines can win from one to five stars, and an overall customer score out of 100. As an example, Jet2 (short-haul) earned five stars for customer service, four in several categories, and in none of the cateories did it win fewer than three stars. Ryanair, on the other hand, didn’t earn more than two stars for anything, and scored one for boarding, seat comfort and food.

Asked by Which? to comment on the survey results, Ryanair had this to say: “Ryanair this year will carry 200m passengers…Not one of our 200m passengers wish to pay “higher prices” as Which? falsely claim.”

Indeed, Ryanair has always been totally unapologetic, as I pointed out in my recent obituary for enjoyable air travel “Surly Bonds (Part 2)”. Quote: “One of the industry’s extant personalities, Ryanair’s chief exec, Michael O’Leary, almost encourages the impression that he chuckles at the pain he can persuade his passengers to undergo to knock a Euro or two off their fare! They just keep coming, he crows. And he’s right, they do – in ever larger numbers!”

But what excuses can British Airways field? It scored lower even than Ryanair on its response to customers who ask for assistance of any kind. Meanwhile on short-haul its highest score was three stars, with a mere two for boarding, seat comfort, food and value for money. On its long-haul routes BA earned four stars for its booking process, but only two on seat comfort, food, cleanliness and value for money.

The UK flag carrier responded: “This research from Which? is entirely at odds with comments from the hundreds of thousands of customers who we know do travel with British Airways and then tell us about their experience.” BA then, in a style reminiscent of recent UK politicians attempting to mitigate dire poll results, lists all the investment it has recently made in cabins and customer service, finally adding: “This [feedback] is also reflected in a recent independent study from Newsweek, which surveyed 17,000 people who voted us their Most Trusted Airline Brand.”

Great brands – and British Airways was indeed a great brand not long ago – can survive a period in the doldrums, but trust can quickly be squandered.

This blog has already vented about the deadly tediousness of air transport today, and the complacent acceptance by the industry of mediocre standards. Flying used to be considered a glamorous and exciting mode of travel, and could be again if spiced with a little imagination.

If that imagination is not invested, the air travel industry will be self-limiting, and environmentalists will be able to celebrate its shortcomings.

Musk’s DOGE starts chopping at the FAA

David Learmount Uncategorized , , , , , , , , , ,

The Professional Aviation Safety Specialists (PASS) union says 133 of its members at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have just been fired following a review of the agency by the new Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). They include aeronautical information managers, who update domestic and international information about the whole aviation environment, including routes, charts, procedures and flight paths, and maintenance mechanics, who maintain air traffic control facilities.

Others sacked include aviation safety assistants, who maintain office records, and environmental protection specialists, who evaluate environmental impacts, ensure compliance with environmental requirements and monitor environmental protection plans. The latter are believed to be particularly threatened by DOGE.

In the case of the FAA, Elon Musk, appointed by president Trump as head of the DOGE, is responsible for finding areas where he believes efficiency can be improved or costs cut, and for reporting these to the Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy. Duffy has since commented, in response to the PASS report on dismissals, that the FAA employs 45,000 people, and those few dismissed were all staff on probation.

As for the acknowledged long-term shortage of air traffic controllers, he blames this on his predecessor at the DoT, Pete Buttigieg, whom Duffy also blamed for doing nothing about “our outdated, World War II-era air traffic control system”. Finally, he alleges that the FAA’s budget is being used as “a slush fund for the green new scam and environmental justice nonsense”.

Duffy did not mention any remedies for President Donald Trump’s publicly stated theory as to why a mid-air collision recently took place over the Potomac River.

Trump, Musk and the FAA

David Learmount Uncategorized , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Just as President Donald Trump rushed to claim that the 29 January mid-air collision over the Potomac River was the result of air traffic control incompetence resulting from the Federal Aviation Administration’s application of DEI (diversity, equity and inclusion) policies in controller recruitment, so others have lined up to point out that there has been an unusual cluster of serious US fatal air accidents since his appointment as POTUS.

Anyone with a brain knows that neither claim has any causal connection with reality.

But I am serving notice today that this blog will examine any proposals that emerge from the Trump-appointed DOGE (Department of Government Efficiency) regarding the funding or reorganization of the FAA, and I invite senior executives and employees of the FAA, the airlines and general aviation bodies to report on substantive changes ordered by DOGE by responding to this blog.

Like others who care about maintaining and advancing aviation safety, I am wary of politically-inspired tinkering with an important oversight agency by leaders who have no expertise in the management of aviation safety. Trump’s first lieutenant Elon Musk, a man of many talents, has been entrusted with heading DOGE. He has a businessman’s appetite for risk-taking.

As Boeing acknowledges, business skills wielded by those for whom safety and quality control is an important concern, but whose primary objective has become shareholder returns, can get the balance wrong and damage both.

The USA has led the post-war world in advancing civil aviation safety, with the FAA being its general and the Flight Safety Foundation its standard-bearer. If the FAA’s ability to oversee industry safety performance and to manage the USA’s airspace is diminished in the name of “efficiency”, it affects global aviation, so the world will be watching with its own interests at heart. The FAA is an agency, a public service, it is not a business.

This appeal for reader feedback will have to be carefully managed, because at this stage the proposed Trump/Musk policies inspire apprehension without advancing any substance worthy of appraisal.

But soon actions will loom, and appraisal must begin.

AI suggests why the Philadelphia medevac crash happened

David Learmount Uncategorized , , , , , , , , , , ,

Can artificial intelligence (AI) provide the factors behind aviation accidents? Maybe we should find out, because people can suddenly believe they are experts as a result of using it.

A reader contacted me on February 1st with the answer that an AI app provided when he asked it what caused the 31 January fatal Learjet air ambulance crash in Philadelphia.

Before discussing the AI’s verdict, here is what we actually know about the short flight: the Learjet 55 took off in the evening dusk (18:06:10 local time) from Philadelphia Northeast Airport runway 24, bound for Springfield, Missouri, with a stretchered patient and five other people on board. The temperature and dew point were both 9deg, the cloud-base was at 400-500ft, light wind and reasonable visibility.

When airborne the aircraft was told to turn right onto heading 290deg, and the pilot received an instruction from Tower to change frequency to Philadelphia Departure Control. He read the new frequency back correctly, and bid the Tower controller a good day.

According to ADS-B data, the Learjet had climbed rapidly to a maximum 1,650ft by about a minute after take-off (18:06:56) , then the aircraft entered a steep, uninterrupted descent to impact with the ground. The impact point was in a suburban area about 2.5nm from the airport, close to the runway extended centreline. The pilot never did make contact with Departure Control, and broadcast messages addressed to the flight by Departure did not receive a response.

According to initial reports by Philadelphia police, no-one on board survived the Learjet crash, one person on the ground was killed and 19 were injured, That is my summary of the basic known facts of what happened.

Meanwhile my reader who asked AI to provide him with an explanation for the crash told me he had, in his question, given the AI app (which he didn’t name) all the facts known at that point.

The executive summary part of the AI answer said this: “Preliminary data from ADS-B tracking, witness reports, and aviation system analysis suggest that Learjet 55 XA-UCI suffered a catastrophic runaway trim event (nose-down), leading to an unrecoverable dive and high-speed impact.” It also supplied what I would describe as cogent arguments to back this verdict up, but no actual evidence for the alleged runaway trim or the electrical fault that it proposed was the reason for it. The whole proposal, however, was delivered in a decidedly confident style.

I decided to take a different approach to test AI on the same subject. Given what we know happened, I asked Chat GPT whether the pilot suffering spatial disorientation as a result of somatogravic illusion could be the explanation for the Learjet accident? ChatGPT’s response first explained what somatogravic illusion is, then responded that, yes, it could indeed be a plausible explanation, but advised me to wait for the National Transportation Safety Board’s report.

Somatogravic illusion is an illusion generated by the delicate human inner ear balance organs when they are subjected to acceleration, linear or rotational. For example, passengers seated in the cabin of an aircraft beginning its acceleration along the runway for take-off can feel that the whole aircraft has tilted slightly nose-up, especially if they are looking straight ahead. But a glance out of the cabin window during the take-off run will prove that no such upward tilt has taken place.

Pilots experience the same somatogravic effect during take-off that passengers do, but since they are looking ahead out the cockpit windscreen – and providing the external visibility is good – their powerful visual sense will overcome the misleading feedback from their balance sensors.

If, however, the acceleration continues after take-off and the crew lose sight of the outside world because of darkness or entering cloud, the misleading feedback from their balance sensors returns. And the natural reaction to believing the aircraft’s nose is higher than it should be is to push forward on the control column, pushing the nose down. The physical feeling that a nose-down push is demanded can entirely overcome the intellectual information presented by the pilots’ flight instruments, because the latter is artificial, unlike powerful instinctive feelings or sight of a natural external horizon.

The Learjet series has a reputation for sporty performance. Its take-off acceleration and rate of climb when airborne are impressive. And the point in this short flight where it all appears to have gone wrong happens to occur at the moment when the pilot is likely to have taken his eyes off the flight instruments for a moment to change the radio frequency. The latter may be just coincidence, however.

There is no data here that could be regarded as evidence about the reasons for the Philadelphia crash, but I do know that the runaway trim explanation is plausible, and so is the pilot spacial disorientation theory.

There could be other reasons, however, and I know well after 45 years in this business that listing “what if” explanations is a waste of time because there are too many. The truth will out, via actual evidence. These days it does not take long, because investigators now strive to provide periodic interim factual reports which signpost the emerging truth.

But full understanding – and thus the ability confidently to act to prevent repetition – only comes with the full facts.

The risks of Washington Reagan airport

David Learmount Uncategorized , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

The fatal mid-air collision over the Potomac River next to Washington Reagan airport on 30 January is seen by many industry commentators, including myself, as an accident waiting to happen. Today it happened.

A PSA Airlines Bombardier CRJ700 twinjet (N709PS), operating as American Eagle flight 5342 from Wichita to Washington, collided with a US Army Sikorsky H-60 Blackhawk over the Potomac. Authorities now say there are not expected to be any survivors among the 64 people on board the PSA flight or the three crewmen in the Blackhawk.

The collision occurred at night but in good visibility, at a height of about 300ft, just as the PSA CRJ turned onto short final approach for runway 33 at Reagan. The airport is right next to the west bank of the Potomac, and the CRJ had been tracking north following the river. Washington tower asked the CRJ crew if they could accept a landing on runway 33, instead of 01 which they had been expecting. A CRJ pilot confirmed that they had visual contact with runway 33 and could accept it. When they approached the extended centreline for runway 33, the crew turned left to position on final approach, and the collision occurred just as they started to cross the river.

Reagan airport is very much a downtown airfield, with the heart of Washington just across the river to the north east, the Pentagon with its helipad immediately to its north west – and Arlington beyond that, and Alexandria to the south. The river is one of the principal corridors for helicopter traffic, most heavily used by the military and White House movements, and Reagan airport itself operates most of the time close to capacity. It is popular with politicians, business people and lobbyists because it is much closer to the heart of power than the city’s international airport at Dulles, more than an hour away in Virginia.

It is not clear whether any party to this accident made a classifiable mistake. It was nighttime, but visibility was good, and air traffic controllers were relying on pilots being able to make visual contact with other close aircraft when they had been advised of their relative position. But it would be easy for the navigation and anti-collision lights of the two aircraft to be lost among the city lights on both river banks, and easy to identify the wrong set of lights before confirming to ATC that they believed they had the other aircraft in visual contact.

In other words, this is a very busy environment, and because of political pressure to keep a downtown airport constantly available for use, Reagan airport and the terminal area around it operates knowingly with risk margins that seriously need reviewing. They probably will be reviewed as a part of the investigation into this accident, but the warnings have been there for years, and still the politicians want their downtown airport to continue doing business at a rate that entails serious risk.

In March 2024 the President and CEO of the US-based Flight Safety Foundation Hassan Shahidi remarked on the fragility of the US air traffic control services in the face of continually escalating demand. He wrote then: “The ongoing issues with runway incursions and other serious safety and quality concerns signal that safety buffers within the industry are being stretched thin. The industry is grappling with numerous challenges, including the recruitment, sourcing, and training of tens of thousands of new workers, the rising demand for travel, and the need to accommodate new and diverse types of operations within the airspace system.”

Speaking about the Washington accident today, President Trump has already been critical of air traffic control, but sees the problem as being caused by the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) adherence to diversity recruiting policies, which he has now stopped. The FAA, a government agency, is responsible for providing America’s air traffic control, and it depends for its funding on the government and congressional approval. If it is under-funded, as the Flight Safety Foundation’s Shahidi implies in his quotation above, President Trump has the power do something about it beyond stopping a diversity recruiting policy.

Jeju Air – the missing four minutes

David Learmount Uncategorized , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Birdstrikes on airliners are not rare, but they don’t usually cause crashes, let alone fatal ones.

The most famous birdstrike accident before the Jeju Air crash at Muan, Korea a little more than a month ago was the “Miracle on the Hudson”, in which a US Airways Airbus A320 climbing away from take-off at New York LaGuardia airport in January 2009 hit a flock of large geese that disabled both engines. What followed captured the public’s imagination to the extent that Hollywood made a movie about it.

When the geese collided with his aircraft, Captain “Sully” Sullenberger made the decision not to attempt a turn-back to land on the runway, but to glide down for a ditching in the Hudson River. All 155 passengers and crew survived the ditching in the river’s freezing water.

Moving forward 15 years, the Korean aviation and railway and accident investigation board (ARAIB) interim report on the 29 December 2024 Jeju Air crash at Muan International Airport has now confirmed that the chain of events leading to the accident also started with a birdstrike on both engines. The Boeing 737-800, on final approach to runway 01 at Muan, ran into a flock of small ducks which caused the engines and the aircraft extensive damage. Details of the extent and nature of the damage have not been established, but it is clear that some of the aircraft’s electrical systems stopped working.

Much more would normally be known at this stage, but the flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) stopped operating at the time of the birdstrike (08:58:50 local time), depriving the investigators of extensive data about the last four minutes of the flight that would otherwise have been captured. Simultaneously the aircraft’s ADS-B transmissions that enable the its three-dimensional trajectory to be tracked in real time also stopped, so it will be more difficult to establish the precise course the crew flew in order to line up for the emergency landing they chose to make.

It was at 08:54:43 that Jeju Flight 7C2216, inbound from Bangkok, Thailand, had first contacted Muan Control Tower and received clearance to land on runway 01. If they had not already done so, at that point they would have selected the undercarriage down and set the flaps for landing.

The first hint of the problems the flight was about to face came four minutes later when the Tower warned the Jeju pilots of bird activity ahead (08:57:50). At that point they were about 3nm from their anticipated landing. The electrical failure that stopped the two recorders occurred a minute later at 08:58:50, at which time the aircraft was still 1.1nm away from the threshold of runway 01, according to the ARAIB report.

The crew saw the flock of ducks ahead and below them just before the birdstrike, it seems, so they decided to abandon the approach and carry out a go-around, increasing engine power and starting to climb away. Six seconds later, at 08:58:56 local time, they declared a Mayday emergency, citing a birdstrike, and announcing their go-around, which had now become far more difficult to carry out because of reduced power from the damaged engines.

The report emphasizes that recordings during the last 4min 7sec of the flight are missing. That is the time that elapsed between the electrical failure that stopped the recorders and the moment of the 737’s violent collision with the earth and concrete mound beyond the end of the landing runway in which the ILS localizer antenna array was embedded (09:02:57).

Image from ARAIB interim report

As they initiated their go-around, the pilots felt – and heard – the birdstrike and witnessed a loss of engine thrust just after they had advanced the throttles to climb away. As a part of the go-around drill the crew retracted the undercarriage and selected the flap fully up. There is no recording to confirm this, but they must have done so, as events in the next few minutes make clear.

The attempt to save the flight

The crew knew they had to get the aircraft on the ground fast in case the damaged engines failed completely, but by this time they were losing sight of the runway 01 threshold below the nose as they initiated their go-around, so landing ahead on 01 was no longer an option. Circling back to set up a new approach to the same runway was risky because they might not have sufficient power to maintain height for that long. The ARAIB report says that the last pressure altitude recorded was effectively 500ft (498ft to be precise), and indicated airspeed was 161kt.

At such a point the pilots would want to gain any height and speed they could with the remaining engine power so as to increase their gliding range in the event of total engine failure, and to stay withing gliding range of the runway. So their decision was to fly ahead, then turn through 180deg to land on the same runway but in the opposite direction – that is designated runway 19. Because, during the go-around, they were positioned to the left of runway 01 and parallel to it, they were committing to a right turn to reverse their heading and line up for the approach to 19.

The workload and stress on the pilots at that moment were massive. They did not know how much engine power they would have, or how long they would still have it, so the temptation to turn early to line up on the runway was high. Video of the aircraft’s arrival on runway 19 at Muan shows the aircraft touching down gently with its wings perfectly level, but nearly 2/3rds of the way along the tarmac, travelling very fast with no flaps set, the undercarriage still retracted, and no spoilers deployed.

With the data available at present there is no way of knowing whether the crew failed to get the flap and gear down because of hydraulic problems, or whether the high workload and lack of time made them forget to deploy them. Apart from the failure of electric power to the flight recorders, the investigators don’t know what other problems the pilots faced.

It’s even difficult to work out why an external collision with relatively small birds (Baikal Teals, average weight given as 400g) would cause an electrical supply to fail, unless the undercarriage was still down at the point of birdstrike, leaving electrical wiring and hydraulic tubing in the gear bay vulnerable to impact damage.

Almost all the 181 people on board the Jeju 737 were killed, the only survivors being two cabin crew strapped into their seats in the tail of the aircraft. Everyone on board would still have been alive until the high speed impact with the solid foundations for the ILS localiser antenna array about 200m into the runway overrun, which caused the aircraft to break up and catch fire.

Air France’s new secret ingredient

David Learmount Uncategorized , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Most airlines no longer attempt to sell air travel as exciting or glamorous, because these days it usually isn’t. We examined that indisputable fact here quite recently.

Air France, however, is trying a new marketing idea to inject some romance into its product. I don’t believe this trick has been tried before – at least not by an airline.

Indeed, I’m not sure any other carrier could even hope to make this idea fly.

But Air France flies the flag of a country that’s home to the concept of Haute Couture, and home also to LVMH, by a massive margin the biggest luxury goods purveyor in the world. And its hub is Paris!

If ever there was a magic metropolitan brand name, Paris is it.

LVMH may not mean anything to most people, but its brands do. It owns Dior, Givenchy, Louis Vuitton and Moët Hennessy, to mention but a few. It doesn’t own Chanel, but that name evokes Paris anyway.

So what is Air France trying to fly?

Its own perfume. Or, as the British upper classes prefer to call it, scent.

It’s called AF001, the flight number of the legendary Air France Concorde departure from Paris Charles de Gaulle for New York JFK.

If the glamorous associations with Paris France don’t sell it to ordinary passengers, that magic flight number will ensure romantic aviation buffs buy it for their wives and girlfriends!

Let’s test the power of an idea, because British Airways flew Concorde too. Couldn’t they try it?

What images does the name of BA’s base, London, evoke? Not a scent, surely, nor romance. Maybe energy, like New York? And Burberry may be famous, but isn’t up there with Hermès and Chanel.

And the airline names: Air France proudly uses its country’s name, whereas British – as in Airways – is an adjective. In branding, these things matter.

Meanwhile other companies have tried to harness the sense of smell, but usually for the purpose of exploiting an already strong brand name to generate a side-hustle that might be a good earner. Harley-Davidson tried it, for example, but would you buy the stuff? If it didn’t smell of oil and come packaged with a guttural sound-track, what’s the point?

Anyway, what does Air France have to say in its press release about its AF001 fragrance?

The airline hired Francis Kurkdjian, master perfumer and artistic director of Maison Francis Kurkdjian, to create the new scent: ‘I’m very proud to have created Air France’s first signature home fragrance. It was the illusion of a ray of sunshine on the wings of an aircraft that inspired me to create this light, fresh and comforting home fragrance’.

Fabien Pelous, the airline’s Customer Experience Manager, waxes lyrical: ‘The Air France travel experience now elevates all five senses: sight, with the haute couture uniforms of our staff, our cabin interiors, and the meticulous design of our lounges, taste with the delicious dishes on the menu on board, touch with the soft fabrics of our seats, sound with our playlists on board, and now smell with this prestigious signature fragrance’ 

The marketing department says the fragrance will become part of the AF ambience: “Air France will be gradually using AF001 in its lounges in Paris and around the world over the coming months. Evoking a feeling of space, calm and light, AF001 accompanies travelers in style. Its comforting musky scent, combined with mimosa from the south of France, adds a sunny, natural vibrancy. Created with hints of jasmine and rose, its delicate floral aura takes travelers on a real olfactory journey, capturing a specific moment in time.”

Personally, I salute any move to bring glamour back to airline travel – or at least to attempt it.

Here’s another test of the idea: what would a perfume called Ryanair or Southwest Airlines smell like?